Case: Anti-dumping measures as protectionism Dumping is defined as selling a product for export at a price lower than the price charged by the same company in its domestic market or at a price price lower than production costs. Dumping can occur for several reasons. First, it can be maintained as a short-term predatory pricing strategy by exporters, designed to put competitors out of business in an export market. Furthermore, it may be the result of market intervention or a government subsidy to a company's production that allows it to artificially lower the cost of exporting. Predatory pricing is illegal under WTO rules if it harms producers in the export market, and states have the right to use WTO anti-dumping rules to ensure that predatory pricing does not unfairly harm their domestic producers. On September 14, 2007, China asked the WTO to resolve the dispute with the United States over Chinese coated paper. China is seeking WTO help following the US Department of Commerce's preliminary decision to impose tariffs on coated paper imported from China. The frequent use of trade protection tools, such as anti-dumping and special guarantee measures, has become a source of trade conflicts between China and the United States. According to WTO statistics, China is the most targeted country in US anti-dumping investigations. With its huge trade deficit, the American government must protect its domestic industries from foreign competitors. It is therefore natural that US authorities resort to anti-dumping measures to protect their domestic industries. Another reason is the strategic interests of the United States. U.S. antidumping cases were found to often be driven by political pressure, national security interests, and historical economic relationships. And these considerations are sometimes more important than economic interests. As demonstrated in the conflict between China and the United States, there is a growing consensus among economists that in many cases anti-dumping policy is an industrial policy tool in disguise. Instead of its primary goal of keeping out “unfair imports,” it often aims to promote the interests of domestic producers. If anti-dumping duties were applied exclusively in situations where predatory pricing is practiced, there would be no justification for complaining about the protectionism of anti-dumping duties. However, anti-dumping duties can be imposed when foreign companies follow normal “fair” trade practices. The WTO allows anti-dumping duties when one of two definitions of a dumping practice is met.