Analysis of Flawed Research The following review of the article analysis by Team B illustrates and identifies several examples of statistical abuse in the practical world as a result of flawed research. The following examples demonstrate how a manager could, and in many examples does, make poor decisions due to inaccurate statistics. The team compiled the findings detailing the respective articles. In the article, Pentagon Decision Making: Seriously Flawed, Karen Kwiatkowski witnessed firsthand how faulty and inaccurate information within the Office of the Secretary of Defense influenced the United States' decision to go to war with Iraq. This business decision not only affected the Bush administration, but also affected the entire country. The article suggests that some parts of this information ended up in speeches given by President Bush in order to mislead America and gain support for the war in Iraq. The following themes are identified in the article (Kwiatkowski, 2003):1. Functional isolation of the professional body. Civil service and active duty military professionals assigned to the USDP/NESA and SP were notably uninvolved in key areas of interest to Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld. These included Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.2. Interagency Cliques: Much has been written about the role of the founding members of the Project for a New American Century, the Center for Security Policy, and the American Enterprise Institute and their new positions in the Bush administration. Certainly, appointees who share particular views are expected to come together, and that an overwhelming number of these appointees have such organizational ties is neither conspiratorial nor unusual. What is unusual is the way this network operates exclusively with its members across various agencies - most notably the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Vice President.3. Groupthink. Defined as "reasoning or decision-making by a group, often characterized by uncritical acceptance of or conformity to prevailing views," groupthink was the predominant feature of the Pentagon's development of Middle East policy. The result of groupthink is the elevation of opinion to a kind of accepted "fact" and the uncritical acceptance of extremely narrow and isolated points of view. This article demonstrates how decisions were made based on intuition rather than credible data. The end result was misleading data. It was suggested that the CIA told employees not to work with other security departments; the Iraqi staff's primary work was performed by political appointees who never communicated with the Bush organization and that groupthink process led to misleading information provided to Congress.