A positive effect of marine biodiversity conservation is that in these situations, impure public goods prevent exploitation by both parties in lieu of a formal system of public regulation or privatization. Seabright points out that the lack of a formal system does not necessarily mean that the work of conserving marine biodiversity is not actually getting done: “But of all the professions, economists should perhaps be the most sensitive to the fallacy that if government does not manage something according to a formal plan, then great inefficiency must occur. Likewise, they should be cautious in assuming that moving from one situation of imprecise incentives to another with more formal but still somewhat imprecise incentives will always improve efficiency” (Seabright 133). As the author points out, the field of economics makes one sensitive to the fact that “formal” situations, such as public regulation of public goods, which still maintain their “imprecise incentives,” will necessarily improve the situation or efficiency in any way . Furthermore, there is the idea of ​​“mutual coercion” in which both parties seek to benefit from the trade of impure public goods through the practice of coercion: “For many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions by distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only type of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by a majority of all those affected” (Hardin 1247). Hardin believes that the capacity for “coercion,” in an economic context, is a further advantage of the impure system of public goods that can facilitate the regulation of biodiversity in the same way that a purely privatized or publicized system could do so..