One way to implement this argument is to say that there is a distinction between (1) being responsible for someone's existence and (2) being responsible for someone's life given that he exists. For example, let's say you were the violinist's doctor ten years ago and the violinist had an illness that would soon take his life. The only way to save him was to prescribe a drug that cures the disease but has a side effect: it will probably cause kidney failure in the future. Knowing that only you have the compatible body to save the violinist if his kidney were to fail, you prescribed the drug. Ten years later we arrive at Thomson's original scenario. In this new case, you are responsible for the violinist's existence since you prescribed him the drug and gave him life, but it can easily be argued that you are not responsible for his dependence on your body because there was no course of action to your part for both of you save the violinist's life and ensure that he can live independently of you. Now, this analogy becomes similar to pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse: the woman is responsible only for the existence of the fetus, not for the life of the fetus, unless she takes responsibility for it herself. Overall, Thomson offers a good response to the parent-child responsibility objection. , but at the same time that answer yes