The dominant view among economists is that the democratic political market is unable to produce the efficient outcomes of an efficient economic market due to uniformed voters, lack of competition and poorly allocated political rights. In his article “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Outcomes,” Donald Wittman denies this belief, arguing that both political and economic markets work well. He states that the democratic political market is a highly competitive system designed to produce wealth-maximizing outcomes and incentivizes politicians to act efficiently (Wittman 1395-1396). Because Wittman is challenging economists' conventional beliefs, he places the burden of proof on those who argue for the efficiency of political markets. Before defending democratic efficiency, he lays out three characteristics typically associated with an efficient economic market: 1) informed and rational participants, 2) in a competitive context, 3) with well-defined and easily transferable property rights (1396). Most models of policy failure assume that the market always lacks one or more of these characteristics. Wittman argues that the political market typically has these characteristics when compared to an efficient market economy. Although Wittman presents strong reasons for democratic efficiency, his arguments ultimately fail. Wittman argues that voters participating in the political marketplace are more informed and rational than previously thought. Previous economists have argued that voters are rationally uninformed because the cost of gathering information exceeds the benefit of obtaining it. This theory assumes that most of the costs of information gathering fall on the voter. However, Wittman provides three ways in which the voter can be relieved of these costs. First, candidates bear the cost of collecting and distributing information