When Nussbaum refers to "human capacities," he is referring to "people's abilities to do and be certain things deemed valuable" (Nussbaum 275). In other words, a capability is the ability to choose how to lead one's life without constraints on any of the available choices. For example, being able to choose which political party to identify with or to practice a religion of one's choice is to be fully human. According to Nussbaum, being rational and being happy is not enough to define humanity. It is the ability to make choices that defines a truly human life and accompanies it with dignity. This begs the question, “What is he actually capable of doing and being?” (Nussbaum 285). Nussbaum introduces a set of three different types of capabilities into his analysis. Basic capacities concern the inherent capacities of practical reasoning that humans are born with as infants, but which they cannot exercise as functions until further development (Nussbaum 289). Internal capabilities are those that build on basic capabilities through the process of education and other related forms of development (Nussbaum 289). She defines combined capabilities as the combination of internal capabilities and external conditions that make the use of a function possible (Nussbaum 290). This is where public policies should be directed because realizing combined capabilities requires promoting internal capabilities and creating an environment in which functions can be put into practice. Capabilities can also be seen as a person's actual freedoms or opportunities as a means to achieve certain functionings. To meet these two requirements, Nussbaum produced a list of "human capabilities" that are needed... in the middle of the paper...). Therefore, if rights to liberty and rights to goods and services are violated in various states, then how can Nussbaum expect to see central capabilities guaranteed in such states? Another downside to states imposing obligations or establishing guarantees is that some may not have the power to fulfill those obligations (O'Neill 435). For example, underdeveloped states or those deemed failed do not have the economic resources and political stability to do so. Others need not be in a similar situation to have failed as duty bearers. States considered strong in the international community may encounter enforcement problems. Even so when they cannot guarantee freedom rights to their voters, as many authoritarian regimes do. Accordingly, O'Neill suggests reconsidering whether all second-order obligations should be assigned to states.