The problem of free will according to Inwagen is simply embarrassing for philosophers. Basically the presentation of each topic is riddled with vague definitions and inconsistent ideas. the root of the problem lies in defining what free will actually is since authors discussing the topic have different terms for free will. these terms are things like compatibilist free will and libertarian free will are a source of great confusion to audiences reading an author's position on the topic. The problem here is elementary, in trying to make a point and convince the audience, it is simply the speaker's responsibility to provide clear definitions. This means that any ambiguous sentences in the argument must be identified and translated for consistency. Inwagen proposes a unifying definition for free will where x is on some occasions capable of doing otherwise. It suggests that libertarian free will may not exist and it is therefore pointless to refer to any point about free will. Furthermore one should be careful when defining free will not to say that x could have done differently since the phrase could have done has a property of ambiguity, it should be avoided. Refer instead to his definition of x is able to do otherwise on some occasions since the phrase able implies that the act of doing otherwise is within x's power. In other words, to clear up the haze in the topic of free will lingers around the words might have and able to pair with having a type of free will. Let's break it down: compatibilists have what they call compatibilist free will and librarians have what they call libertarian free will. this simply means that they are talking about different things or the same thing....... middle of paper ......d mixes things and events observed. simply by thinking, the imagination leaves the freedom to recount these events. perhaps after thorough reflection, it is possible to make a decision, and as the posting says, perhaps you are part of the decision since the decision comes from your mind, and your mind is your only true identity (refer to the idea of ​​self of Descartes). free will can be a mutation of the mind considering that “nothing else in the universe has free will”. In conclusion Inwagen is right on the points he raised as well as assuming that determinism and free will are not compatible. Instead he locked himself into a closed mind into thinking the two are separate, when in nature seemingly unrelated things always find themselves working together after taking a closer look at things. Finally, free will could very well be a product of evolution and the infinite possibility of life.