It is without a doubt that sports agency has grown exponentially over the past two decades (Neiman, 2007). Player agents have become an increasingly important figure in negotiating and negotiating athlete contracts in professional sports (Neiman, 2007). (Steinberg, 1991) also states how agents do not simply assist athletes in negotiating contracts but also support athletes “in the transition to adulthood”. Athlete agents are presented with the challenging task of maximizing their clients' financial returns for the duration of their brief careers in the spotlight (Staudohar & Mangan, 1991). Today, unfortunately, professional athletes are seen by agents as an opportunity to earn large sums of money through advertising their image and style (Staudohar & Mangan, 1991). This has led to dishonest agents not working in the best interests of the athletes themselves and has caused much controversy within the media and public (Crandall, 1981). Despite their necessity, player agents have been subject to a miraculous amount of criticism due to the impact they are having on professional athletes and professional sport as a whole (Steinberg, 1991). The purpose of this essay is to delve into the role of player agents in professional sports in much more detail. Key areas such as the history, roles and responsibilities of player agents, as well as the player-athlete relationship and sports agent returns will be discussed. Next, the essay will evaluate the impact of player agents on specific amateur sports such as college football and non-professional Olympic sports and determine whether they have any kind of role to play, as they already do in professional sports. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay In previous decades, negotiations occurred directly between sports franchises and those of the athletes (Neiman, 2007). Having abandoned school early to pursue an athletic career, negotiations were not an athlete's strong point, having failed to acquire the sufficient skills needed (Mason, 1997). This allowed sports franchises to take advantage of the athlete's lack of knowledge and negotiation skills (Mason, 1997). Consequently, in the 1970s, the Major League Baseball Players Association negotiated with Major League Baseball for the right of athletes to have an associate assist them when consulting with a club (Neiman, 2007). This allowed athletes to maximize their salaries and consolidate their bargaining position thanks to their agent's expert and skillful negotiations (Neiman, 2007). Many athletes still maintain a strong position against the presence of a third party representative, opting to negotiate on their own (Crandall,1981). Although the help of an agent can be of great help and benefit to athletes ( Crandall,1981). Originally, the primary role of player agents was only to manage player contracts with professional sports teams (Mason & Slack, 2005). However, as money has become an increasing factor in sport, the impact, roles, and responsibilities of player agents have also increased (Heitner & Saul, 2013). In addition to dealing with player contracts, agents now handled sponsorship deals, marketing contracts, trust funds, tax advice, retirement planning and many other key areas, ensuring that athletestook full advantage of their public image (Mason & Slack, 2005) . This evolution has led to an increase in scandals as agents have become increasingly involved in the lives of their athletes, allowing them to abuse their power and perform in the best interests of themselves rather than the athlete (Heitner & Saul, 2013 ) (Crandall, 1981). along with the boom in agent representation in sport, meant that agent-athlete relationships became almost as important as an athlete's relationship with their team itself (Crandall, 1981). Agency falls under common law and therefore the agent is subject to this when entering into a relationship with an athlete (Neiman,2007). Agents and athletes have a fiduciary relationship, meaning that agents must show honesty, loyalty, and good faith towards their athlete by acting altruistically for the athlete's benefit (Champion, 1996). When discussing athlete contracts, an agent must always keep the athlete's best interest in mind (Hynes,1997). A fiduciary relationship is first and foremost an alliance based on trust, since it is an uncertain relationship whose outcomes are often vague and ambiguous (Hynes, 1997). (Champion 1996) argues that the standard representation contract is the main key to the player-agent relationship as it highlights the rights and responsibilities between the player and the agent. The contract requires that the agent must make good faith efforts on behalf of the athlete during negotiations, even if they are not always successful (Champion, 1996). The contract also stipulates that the agent must avoid conflicts of interest when conferring on behalf of the athlete (Champion, 1996). Although agents can provide many functions for an athlete, their primary goal is to negotiate an athlete's employment contract with a team (Neiman, 2007). In doing so the agent must reveal to the athlete all the necessary information about the contract offered by the company and must also be aware of the collective bargaining agreement of the league in which the athlete will work (Neiman, 2007). The agent must also be informed of all relevant information about the athlete himself during the negotiation in order to secure the highest possible salary for his athlete for the longest period of time (Neiman,2007). One case that defines a violation of this type of relationship is Detroit Lions, Inc. V. Argovitz (Ring, 1987). In this case, Detroit Lions player Bill Sims was misrepresented and involved in a cycle of conflicts of interest (Ring, 1987). Sims was recommended by his agent Jerry Argovitz to join the USFL team, Houston Gamblers (Ring, 1987). Argovitz did not tell his client that he was the co-owner of Houston Gamblers at the time and attempted to continue as Sims' agent (Ring, 1987). This was an example of fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty by the agent that led to the termination of Sims' second contract (Champion, 1996). The court ruled that, although the player had interests in this USFL team, the agent failed to fulfill his obligation to inform his principal of all facts of which he was aware, which could affect the interests of the players or influence the actions of the players (Champion, 1996 ). This case is a vivid example of an agent acting in their best interests over the athletes. Another case that highlights a breach of fiduciary duties is the case of Zinn V. Parrish (Champion,1996). Sports agent Leo Zinn was hired by football player Lemar Parrish to provide business and tax advice, negotiate contracts, filter investment information, seek approval, and assist with off-season employment (Epstein & Niland, 2009). The two agreed that Zinn would receive oneten percent commission on all contracts negotiated on behalf of Parrish (Epstein & Niland, 2009). In 1974, Zinn successfully negotiated a contract for Parrish with the Cincinnati Bengals (Epstein & Niland, 2009). Having failed to perform most of the other agreed upon tasks, Parrish fired Zinn and refused to pay him the ten percent commission (Epstein & Niland, 2009). Zinn sued Parrish seeking to recover his compensation (Champion, 1996). Parrish argued that Zinn acted as an investment advisor rather than an agent, resulting in the contract being void because the agent was not registered (Champion, 1996). Zinn is a prime example of an officer who fails to carry out his duties in good faith. In recent years, sport has grown into a multibillion-dollar industry (Garbarino, 1994). As this has happened, the greed of sportThe concept of agency has expanded by describing (Ring, 1987) player agents as “destructive, devious and inept”. According to (Crandall, 1981) agents often receive an average of 10% of what an athlete earns from all sources. When negotiating a contract, agents often act in their best interests so as to receive immediate compensation even if it is a contract without a guarantee of profit (Crandall, 1981). This means that if an athlete were to sign a long-term contract, the agent would be overcompensated as the player may not fulfill the entire time period of his contract (Crandall, 1981). An example of this is the case of Burrow V. Probus Management, Inc. (Burke,1993). In this case the district judge concluded that the footballer, who had been advised by his agent to accept a lump sum bonus, was not in the best interests of the client, but was intended to make the agent earn money immediately, which created a fiscal liability (Burke, 1993). Due to the sharp increase in money in sports, some sports agents have increased their prices accordingly and charge up to 25% of all contracts they secure for their athletes, which is an exceptionally large portion of the players' salary (Crandall, 1981). . This high demand has resulted in agents being accused and accused of receiving an excessive amount of commissions from players' contracts (Crandall, 1981). In Brown V. Woolf, Robert Woolf was hired on Brown's behalf to discuss a contract with the Pittsburgh Penguins (King,1987). This occurred at a time when the popularity of the World Hockey Association had increased (King, 1987). This could be used by players as a bargaining tool and provide them with the opportunity to increase their demands (King, 1987). Brown chose to join the WHA and Woolf secured the contract (King,1987). Unfortunately for Brown, league instability forced the original deal to be renegotiated (King,1987). The new contract provided for the reduction of compensation and the suppression of the pension fund (King,1987). Despite this reduction, Woolf demanded the full compensation under the original contract, plus compensation (King, 1987). In the end, Woolf managed to receive only 21% of the 24% received by her client Brown (King, 1987). This illustrates the modern trend in sports to make player agents' commissions based on what the athlete actually receives and pass on player agents' greed. There is strong competition among agents for athletes' signatures, due to the potential high income returns (Shropshire, 1995). The Dallas Cowboys running back's $13.6 million contract is just one example (Shropshire, 1995). Based on salary alone, his agent would earn $136,000 a year, over a four-year period (Shropshire, 1995). With luxurious salaries likeboasted by both professional athletes and agents, it is not surprising to see the high demand for people wishing to become athletes' agents (Garbarino, 1994). Unfortunately, the demand for life as an agent has created an influx in the relationship between potential agents and professional athletes or superstars (Willenbacher, 2004). In April 2002, the NFL Players Association reported that nearly 800 of 1,200 certified agents did not have a single client (Willenbacher, 2004). This has led to many agents becoming willing to do anything in exchange for the signatures of amateur athletes (Willenbacher, 2004). This has pushed agents to use illegal, unethical and unscrupulous approaches, which undoubtedly impact amateur sports (Willenbacher, 2004). Agents who attempted to persuade players to sign by then broke National Collegiate Athletic Association rules by offering money and other unethical tactics to recruit athletes (Shropshire, 1989). The primary goal of the NCAA is to prepare colleges for professional sports (Shropshire, 1989). The NCAA established rules governing the eligibility of student athletes in order to maintain college eligibility and preserve amateurism (Shropshire,1989)(Crandall,1981). NCAA regulations do not have the force of law, meaning that officials are not required to follow the rules and do not punish those who do (Shropshire, 1989). (Crandall, 1981) argues that agents signing college athletes before they actually finish college is the most common form of agent abuse. Bad advice is another problem created by agents, causing unsolicited disputes (Crandall,1981). This occurs when professional sports teams sign college players before their college eligibility has expired (Crandall,1981). Many athletes who sign these secret contracts end up violating them to sign for other teams, exacerbating an already unethical situation (Crandall, 1981). Generally in this case the court sides with the athlete as it considers the first contract unenforceable (Crandall,1981). The case of Houston Oilers, Inc. V. Neely is an example of litigation (Whitehall,1981). In this case, Ralph Neely secretly signed a contract with the Houston Oilers before his college eligibility expired (Whitehall, 1981). Neely then proceeded to break this contract and sign with another team (Whitehall, 1981). Surprisingly on this occasion the court sided against Neely stating that although secretly signing a contract is prohibited, negotiating the contract at any time is not and therefore does not allow the athlete to ignore their contracts (Whitehill,1981). Neely was forced to fulfill his initial contract with the Oilers (Crandall,1981). Personally, I'm in favor of having an agent. I believe that any young male or female athlete with the ability to achieve great success, and earn a large sum of money while doing so, would be naive if they did not hire a professional agent. Unfortunately, the difficulty in hiring an agent is that there are very few reliable agents. Nowadays agents abuse their clients and focus mainly on their own needs rather than those of their athletes. In my opinion, money in sports has led to high demands from those who wish to become agents, which is dangerous for professional athletes but even more so for amateur athletes. With the demand to become a sports agent and the ratio of certified agents to professional athletes so high, agents are under considerable stress (Willenbacher,2004). This has influenced many agents and pushed them to develop a “do whatever it takes” attitude, 1996),.1225.