One of the most famous passages in Plato's Symposium and the one that seems to receive the most attention in contemporary philosophy is Diotima's Ladder of Love. Diotima explains that love is an ascent through a series of stages or steps on the ladder that ultimately lead to the Form of the Beautiful. This view of love is somewhat problematic, however, and many critics commonly accuse the Love Ladder of being instrumental, impersonal, and abstract. Plato's supporters, especially Kristian Urstad, argue that this criticism is slightly wrong and defend Plato's love insofar as it is not as instrumental and impersonal as is said of it. However, this effort is simply courageous as La Scala ultimately proves to adapt to its criticism. There is little convincing evidence to the contrary, and the most problematic is Alcibiades' speech. There is only one possible argument that can entertain Plato's critics and only one redeemable quality about the ascent. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Revealing the Side of Plato's Critics Plato's critics argue that when we climb the first three steps of the ladder from loving a beautiful body, to loving all beautiful bodies, to loving a beautiful soul, we only use others instrumentally. That is, we love others as a means to an end. Critics highlight the following passage from the Symposium: “He will fall in love with the beauty of an individual body… then he will have to see that the beauty of each individual body is the same. At this point, he must be the lover of every lovely body, and proportion his passion to that deeming it of little or no importance (210b). we ascend to the higher ones. For example, if we are on the third step of the Ladder and we love beautiful souls, we will no longer love beautiful bodies. Plato's love is very exclusive in this sense. Furthermore, as we ascend, we take away the value or importance of those we once loved, making them interchangeable, almost discardable. As the ascent continues, from the love of laws and activities, to the love of knowledge, to the love of the Form of Beauty itself, critics argue, that love becomes impersonal and abstract. Thus far in our ascent we have loved the beauty in the bodies and souls of others. As we climb the Ladder, beauty is no longer found in concrete individuals but in abstractions such as laws, institutions and knowledge. And when we finally reach the final step of the Ladder, Diotima notes that “the lover…will be free from human flesh, from color, and from all that mortal rubbish (211e).” Love according to Plato is a dehumanizing and impersonal quest to achieve Beauty in its most abstract form. At these higher stages we abandon people altogether, and at the final step of the Ladder our love is no longer directed towards anything worldly. What are the arguments of Plato's supporters Kristian Urstad argues that this popular reading of Plato is wrong. Urstad believes that Plato never wants us to abandon our lovers. It's a matter of interpretation. When Diotima speaks in 210b, we must not give up everything of value in them, but rather readjust it. We do not abandon our loved ones in a physical sense, but rather we abandon the limited scope in which we could see them. We simply free ourselves from the obsession with the physical beauty of our lover's body. When Diotima states that "servile love of youthful beauty is a thing of the past (210d)," we see it again. Urstad points out that what Diotima wants us to discard is precisely the love of a handsome boy. And when we do this, we begin to recognize what is truly valuable, what is truly worth loving: not anymorebodies and souls but rather more abstract characteristics. And it is these abstractions, according to Plato, that most closely resemble Beauty and are in turn most deserving of our love (Urstad,35-38). Therefore, Urstad urges us to see that in reality love is not instrumental or impersonal. We climb the ladder but we do not turn our backs on our loved ones, on the contrary, we embrace them in a richer, fuller and more appropriate way. Now we can recognize and appreciate our lovers in their entirety. Kristian Urstad's response to popular criticism is courageous, but fails to convince us. It becomes really problematic with Alcibiades' speech and frustrates any further attempts to defend Plato. Socrates is most likely on the fifth step but certainly in the second half of the Ladder, while Alcibiades chasing Socrates is on the third. We can be sure of this since Alcibiades loves Socrates who is not aesthetically pleasing (he compares him to a satyr in 215b), so he must love Socrates for his beautiful soul. It is not Socrates' appearance but his wisdom that exerts an erotic attraction on men like Alcibiades. This is at least one proof that the Ladder exists as Alcibiades surpasses loving bodies and reaches loving souls. But this shows that Socrates, who is on a higher rung on the ladder than Alcibiades, rejects Alcibiades' love. Do we see Socrates loving Alcibiades here in a broader and more inclusive scope as Urstad suggests? The answer is definitely no. Socrates seems completely unmotivated by physical pleasures and insensitive to Alcibiades' sexual advances. Socrates further states that he is "not interested in exchanging his genuine wisdom for physical beauty... [or] gold for bronze (218e)." There is no scenario in which Socrates could love Alcibiades because Socrates exclusively loves wisdom. The proof lies in the fact that Socrates does not sleep that night and in the morning he has a hangover. Instead he stays up and argues the whole time and then goes about his normal activities the next day. His love of wisdom is not hindered or interrupted by any distractions found in the previous passages. Overall, Urstad isn't necessarily wrong, he just turned the tables. As we ascend the Ladder we abandon all concern and value for those at the lower stages. We definitely don't love them more broadly. However, the opposite appears to be true. Those at the lower rungs love those at the higher rungs in a richer and more complete way. Alcibiades loves Socrates not for his body but for his soul, for his knowledge of Greek customs and laws and for his wisdom. Plato's critics are still right, but Urstad has understood something that needs to be clarified. There is an argument I would like to propose that may shed new light on the discussion so far. It can at least entertain the idea that La Scala is not so instrumental and impersonal. We have said so far that the opposite of Urstad is true; Alcibiades loves Socrates in a broader and more inclusive way, not the other way around. But could Socrates ever love Alcibiades? After all, climbing can be a mutual experience. Let's continue to look at Socrates and Alcibiades. Alcibiades tells Socrates: “Socrates is the only worthy lover for him and can gratify him in any way if Socrates agrees to help him achieve the greatest possible excellence (218c-d).” Alcibiades doesn't understand love (or at least Plato's love) and wants to skip the steps of the Ladder and so Socrates obviously rejects him. Socrates, however, helps Alcibiades up the ladder. Just as in other dialogues of Plato, but not so explicitly in the Symposium, Socrates' behavior towards Alcibiades is that of typical Socratic fashion: elenchus. And just as with the other interlocutors, Socrates leaves Alcibiades confused and humiliated, but in a position where Alcibiades can reevaluate his assumptions.