The aim of this assignment is to explore the effects of how European law has shaped and influenced media regulation in the UK. It is crucial that the task focuses on the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe and the European Union. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original EssayThe "media" whose regulation I am discussing are the public means of mass communication, especially print, radio, and television, but also including films and recorded music, as well as a variety of new means of distribution cable, satellite, Internet, etc. Of growing importance is the Internet, which can now be considered a "mass medium" in its own right on the basis of its progressive diffusion among majorities in many countries and its use for numerous public communication functions, both in the fields of entertainment and communication. 'information. The boundary between public and private communication is important from a regulatory point of view, but it is much less easy to identify than in the past, especially in relation to the Internet which serves as a means of personal communication as well as a means of dissemination and a form of publication. To some extent, the same is true for cell phones. Regulation refers to the entire process of controlling or guiding, through established rules and procedures, applied by governments and other political and administrative authorities to all types of media activities. Therefore regulation is always a potential intervention into ongoing activities, usually for some stated “public interest” objective, but also to meet market needs (e.g., supporting competition) or for reasons of technical efficiency (e.g. , establishing technical solutions). standards). Regulation takes many forms, ranging from clauses in national constitutions and laws to administrative procedures and technical specifications. Regulation can be both internal and external. In the first case we usually speak of "self-regulation", in which internal controls are applied, sometimes in response to public pressure or criticism from outside. The Council of Europe is the oldest political body in Europe. The body was formed shortly after the end of World War II in 1949. The council includes most, but not all, European countries. In all, the Council of Europe comprises 47 member states, some of which are probably not geographically located in Europe. The Council's stated objectives are the support of human rights, the rule of law in Europe, democracy and the promotion of European culture. Unlike the EU, the Council of Europe is not able to create binding laws, however it has the power to enforce some international agreements reached by European states on numerous issues. A well-known body of the Council of Europe is the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights applies the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of Europe has been promoting the idea of ​​media self-regulation for many years. Over the years, the virtues of media self-regulation and the vices of state regulation have been discussed in numerous seminars and recommendations. For example, in the Explanatory Memorandum to “Recommendation (2001) 8 on self-regulation regarding computer content”, the Committee of Ministers noted that “self-regulation has become an important and recognized mechanism for the media to avoid state legislation restrictive on the dissemination of information through the media, especially in matters of decency and moral values ​​that differwidely between individuals and States, while ensuring compliance with certain standards, some actors in the new communication and information services have undertaken initiatives to create their own self-regulatory mechanisms"[1]. More recently, in a reflection paper on “Ethical journalism and human rights”, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, argued that “the reworking of the concept of media responsibility calls for a new vision of regulation of the media, which goes beyond bureaucratic frameworks for the control of journalism and which encourages self-regulation as a positive force for setting high standards and upholding them. This could be achieved by adapting existing press councils or state media commissions, but less complex forms of peer review will continue, such as the use of editors or readers' ombudsmen, or through professional journals and systematic media monitoring and reporting by non-governmental organizations and human rights bodies. New systems may benefit from legal safeguards, but unless they are modeled on self-government and provide an independent voice to civil society, they will constantly face the danger of undue political or corporate influence”[2] . In his November 2011 commentary , he said that self-regulation “protects the independence of the media.” But this is not an issue that has ever been directly considered in the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights. The Court has never analyzed the question between “self-regulation” and “state regulation” from the point of view of Article 10. The basic position seems clear. First, a system of mandatory media regulation constitutes prima facie an interference with the right to freedom of expression and must, therefore, be justified under Article 10(2). Second, such a system, if adopted by law, would clearly comply with the law and pursue a legitimate purpose (for example, the protection of the rights of others). Accordingly, thirdly, the crucial question would then be whether the system was “necessary in a democratic society” – whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. However, there are some general arguments that can be made in favor of the proposition that no form of mandatory regulation could ever be justified under Article 10(2). An important argument arises from the wording of Article 10 itself. article 10, paragraph 1 – the provision that provides for the right to freedom of expression – provides that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from public authorities and regardless of frontiers. This article does not prevent States from requiring the granting of licenses to broadcasting or cinematographic undertakings. The third sentence seems to contemplate the granting of licenses to broadcasters and cinemas, but not to the printed press. It could therefore be argued that Article 10 appears to have been drafted on the basis that “licensing” for print media was unacceptable and that compulsory regulation was, in essence, a form of licensing. However, this interpretation does not appear to be consistent with 10, n. 1, third sentence. The position was illustrated in Groppera Radio AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 321 Groppera Radio AG, a public limited company under Swiss law, has its registered office in Zug (Canton of Zug) and produces radio programmes. Mr. Jürg Marquard, Mr. Hans-Elias Fröhlich and Mr. Marcel Caluzzi are all Swiss citizens. MrMarquard is a publisher and lives in Zug; he manages Groppera Radio AG and is its legal representative and sole shareholder. Mr. Fröhlich, journalist and employee of Groppera Radio AG, lives in Thalwil (Canton of Zurich). Mr Caluzzi is also employed by the company as a journalist and lives in Cernobbio in Italy, but also has a home in Lucerne. The Court notes that Article 19 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain a provision corresponding to the third sentence of Article 10(1). The negotiation process of Article 19 demonstrates that the inclusion of such a provision in that article was proposed for the purpose of granting a license not for the information transmitted, but rather for the technical means of transmission, in order to avoid chaos in the use of Article 19.frequencies. However, its inclusion was opposed on the grounds that it could be used to impede freedom of expression, and it was decided that such a provision was not necessary because it was believed that licensing in the sense intended was covered by reference to "public policy " in paragraph 3 of the article. This confirms the conclusion that the purpose of the third sentence of Article 10(1) of the Convention is to make clear that States can control through a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organized in their countries. territories, in particular in its technical aspects. However, it is not expected that licensing measures would otherwise not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 2 (art. 10-2), as this would lead to a result contrary to the object and purpose of article 10 as a whole. Consequently, the wording of Article 10(1) sheds no light on the general acceptability of mandatory media regulation under Article 10. Numerous arguments can be put forward in favor of the compatibility of mandatory media regulation with Article 10 in an appropriate case. First, there is some support in the Court's jurisprudence for a positive obligation to engage in adequate regulation of the media. The Court of Human Rights has emphasized on many occasions in recent years that the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 must be balanced against the right to reputation under Article 8. This led the Grand Chamber to state that “Contracting States are authorized, or even obliged, by their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention… to regulate the exercise of freedom of expression so as to ensure adequate legal protection of the reputation of persons, they shall not do so so as to unduly dissuade the media from fulfilling its role of alerting the public to apparent or suspected abuse of public power” Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania[3]. The Grand Chamber then underlined that investigative journalists should not be inhibited from reporting on matters of general public interest due to the risk of imprisonment or disqualification from practicing their profession. No system of mandatory regulation contemplated by the Leveson inquiry would presumably result in sanctions of this kind. Second, it could be argued that compulsory regulation of large publishers is fundamentally different from licensing of journalists. The latter means that you are not allowed to write for the media without being a member of a state-approved body. The first means that some, but not all, publishers must obey certain basic rules if they want to be allowed to publish. Third, it is well established that mandatory regulation of broadcast media and advertising is acceptable under Article 10, provided that it isnecessary and proportionate. In principle there is no difference between mandatory regulation in these areas and mandatory regulation of the press. The question is whether the requirements of Article 10(2) are met. Finally, the question of whether a particular interference with a Convention right is justified is fact specific: it is necessary to examine the precise characteristic of the proposed system. The nature of the regulator and the code it applies would be relevant factors in the exercise of proportionality, as would the extent of the application of the mandatory regime. The Court will also take into account the “evil” that the regulatory system was supposed to address. A system of mandatory regulation for large publishers recommended by the Leveson Inquiry would be designed to address the “harm” of large-scale invasion of rights identified by the Inquiry. If a regulator were independent of any government influence and applied a Code drawn up with substantial input from the media and journalists, these would all be factors that the Court would take into account in the “justification exercise”. In summary, although the Council of Europe has strongly promoted self-regulation, it is likely that mandatory regulation of the press will not, in itself, be incompatible with the requirements of Article 10. Compatibility will depend on the precise form of the mandatory regulation proposal and its justifications. Care will likely be taken to ensure that investigative journalism is not inhibited and that constraint is limited to large and powerful publishers. In these circumstances, provided that a system of mandatory regulation remains fully independent of government, it seems likely that it would be found compatible with Article 10. The media law case law and legislation of the former Union Economic Community European Union (EEC), now The European Union (EU) is characterized to a large extent by its focus on the development of a common market rather than on the pursuit of human rights standards. Under EU law, media goods and services had been perceived, first and foremost, as economic goods. In the fundamental Sacchi ruling, the then European Court of Justice (ECJ) established that the transmission of television signals, including those of an advertising nature, falls within the provisions of the Treaty relating to services[4]. In the case Procureur du Roi v Debauve, the European Court of Justice also included the transnational transmission of radio and television signals via cable in the treaty rules relating to services[5]. Subsequently, however, the EEC/EU also recognized the media as a factor of public interest with implications that go well beyond the market, such as cultural diversity, the right to information, diversity of opinions and media plurality, protection of minors and consumer protection. Furthermore, it was the European Court of Justice that introduced human rights into the EU legal order. Since then, fundamental rights have formed an integral part of the general principles of law respected by the Court. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on freedom of expression concerns in particular statements by EU officials and the relationship between freedom of expression and fundamental freedoms in the law now Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in which the freedom of expression reinforces a claim for free movement or constitutes a legitimate interest capable of justifying a restriction on fundamental freedoms. The principles established by the jurisprudence of the Courts are now reaffirmed in Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union. Furthermore, the EUChFR, which has the same [15]