A Subjective Deduction by Kant A deduction is not a "deduction" in the traditional philosophical sense. Rather, it is a “justification” in the sense of the language of legal practice. (1) What Kant wants to justify is that the categories are the a priori necessary conditions for the possibility of experiential objects. This justification also plays another role in Kant's overall project. If he can show that categories are the necessary a priori bases for the possibility of experiential objects, then he can justify the use of synthetic a priori philosophical propositions. The preservation of such propositions is central to Kant's task in the Critique of Pure Reason. To determine whether Kant's justification is adequate, we will need to do three things. First, we will examine his doctrine of “threefold synthesis” in subjective deduction A. Second, we will examine subjective deduction A step by step to clarify the matter. Finally, we will analyze the argument for solidity, thus determining whether Kant's deduction is truly successful. Kant starts from the premise that all representations belong to the internal sense, since they are modifications of the mind. He subsequently develops the theory of a triple synthesis necessary for the final "recognition" of an experiential object. The primary “engine” behind each level of synthesis is transcendental imagination. For Kant, imagination is the sufficient cause of all mental activity. In the case of the three syntheses, imagination is the sufficient reason for the "synthesis", synthesis being the operation of the mind on the representational content. Every synthesis has an a priori and an empirical side. In any case there is an a priori mental approach... at the center of the paper. We have tried to answer this, but if the proponent of rogue intuitions were to bear the burden of proof, then this would imply that Kant's conclusion about the subjective deduction A is false. It would not be true that the categories are the a priori necessary bases for the possibility of experiential objects, since there might be sensory objects for which the categories are not the basis of their possibility, i.e. those possible objects of rogue intuition. Works Cited1 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, A84.2 Guyer, The Cambridge Companion to Kant, "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", p. 138.3 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, A98-99.4 ibid., A102.5 ibid., A104.6 ibid., A106-107.7 Guyer, The Cambridge Companion to Kant, "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", p. 137.8 ibid., p. 144.