The First World War was perhaps the greatest catalyst for military innovation in modern history. The speed with which doctrinal, technical and tactical changes were developed and implemented was astonishing. At the end of the First World War, Britain was at the forefront of doctrinal and technological innovation in armored weapons and air warfare. The factors that caused Britain to lose its innovative edge in these areas before the Second World War were decades-long government policy, the operational attitude of the British Army and the emphasis on land aviation. At the conclusion of the First World War, Britain had the world's largest navy, a brand new Royal Air Force (RAF), and an army that had expanded its technical, tactical and operational capabilities. Although the British Army was strong, by the end of the war their economy was on the verge of collapse. The fiscal burdens of rebuilding the economy required the British government to carefully consider its spending after the war. In 1919 it was decided, for planning purposes, that the armed forces would not plan to fight a major war for 10 years; the policy would be known as the 10-year policy. The policy reduced the military budget to funding levels lower than those appropriated in 1914. This reduced budget limited the size of the armed forces and provided limited funds for research and development of new equipment. This discouraged British civilian companies from investing large sums of capital in research and development of military products, because the British Army lacked the funds to purchase equipment on a large scale. The policy was made permanent in 1928, resulting in the ten-year clock being reset each year... half of the document... published on the Internet at http://www.nationalarchives.gov .uk/cabinetpapers/themes /10-year-rule-disarmament.htm on December 31, 2014. Geoffrey Megargee The Army Before Last: British Military Policy 1919-1939 and Its Relevance for The US Army Today accessible on the Internet at http:/ /www.dtic. mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379001 on December 31, 2014.Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,: Cambridge Press, 1996, 20IbidIbid 22Ibid 25Ibid 26Classroom discussion/lecture during Instruction Block H200 by Edward BowieIbidFort Leavenworth USACGSC, August 2011 US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Military Innovation in Peace and War August 2011 page 85Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,: Cambridge Press, 1996, 195