The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire changed the political-military situation in Europe. Almost fifty years of Cold War between the Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact countries, with relatively large standing armies and prepared mobilization plans, are over. Clash between large mechanized formations in the European countryside became increasingly unlikely and forced many Western countries to identify a new role for their armed forces as new threats emerged. However, those military organizations often struggle with such doctrinal innovations, especially under conditions of economic austerity combined with rapid technological improvements. While such strategic situations determine the environment in which the Army operates, ultimately it is the people who lay the foundation for a new approach. Therefore, successful innovation within a military organization depends on aligning political and military strategy, creating a learning organization, and securing popular support for the military. This essay identifies principles that drive change at the organizational level based on examples from the interwar period, and is not intended to discuss either tactical or technical changes in detail. Such an essay would require a more in-depth study that distances us from the initial argument. Without a doubt, during the interwar period almost all military organizations reformed, based on the lessons learned from the First World War, and each of them achieved significant progress in certain areas. However, some organizations as a whole have demonstrated greater adaptive capacity than others. Above all, innovations within military organizations depend on the integration of political and military vision. ...... middle of paper ...... The challenge of change: military institutions and new realities, 1918-1941”. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 37-41.Williamson, Murray. “Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experience,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-24. Eugene, C. Kiesling in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941.” Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 3 and 10-11.Murray, op. cit., 14-15.Ibid, 9.Ibid, 13.House. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization in the 20th Century. 66.Murray, op. cit., 17.Ibid, 24-25.Murray, op. cit., 125-127 e 139.