In this article, I will argue that retributivism is impractical to implement as a theory of punishment based on judgments of merit, proportionality, and moral responsibility. To do this, I will begin by giving a definition of punishment. Punishment can be defined as “the authorized imposition of deprivations – of liberty or privacy or other benefits to which the person would otherwise be entitled, or the imposition of special burdens – because the person has been found guilty of some violation criminal…” (Bedau, “Punishment”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Punishment can be seen as a conceptual structure that can be just or unjust. For example, punishment can be unjust if it is excessive and if it is lenient to the extent that a criminal is punished. Retributivism can therefore be used as the sole goal or principle to justify a conceptual institutional structure such as punishment. Retributivism is a form of punishment that requires the punishment to fit the crime. There are two justifications for retributivism: retributivism is justified in punishing those who deserve punishment, and that we should punish those who deserve punishment in proportion to their merit. There is a third justification of retributivism, according to which the burden of the crime derives only from the individual's act itself and not elsewhere. Therefore, retributivism reflects the principles of merit and proportionality in the pursuit of justice because it justifies punishments to the deserving in equal value to the gravity of the criminal act. In other words, a person's criminal act follows his own punishment. Retributivism states that criminals deserve punishment commensurate with their crimes. In this theory of punishment, individuals are only punitis...... middle of paper ......m fails as a theory of punishment that punishes people in proportion to their moral merit. In conclusion, retributivism may be more plausible as a theory of punishment because it fails to establish practical applications of its claims within society. Retributivists are unable to determine the extent of a person's individual desert based on his act. However, we cannot be certain of the offender's mindset beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore cannot be precise in determining that deserving punishment is congruent with retributivism. Accuracy is not guaranteed in our judgments of merit, proportionality and moral responsibility. Therefore, because our judgments on this question may differ from actual values ​​of merit, proportionality, and moral responsibility, it will be impossible for retributivism to be implemented as an institution of punishment..