IntroductionIn our society, oil is one of the basic requirements. Whether driving from point A to point B or flying between distant countries, oil has always had a fundamental impact on our civilization. Its impact is felt, daily and in many ways. Not a day goes by without hearing about the changing trend of Brent in the markets of New York or London. Some have thought that the desire to gain control of Iran's oil resources was at the heart of the CIA's intervention in that country in the 1950s. In recent years, left-wing groups have believed that the war in Iraq was based on an attempt at foreign control over Iraq's oil resources. While both events have an undisputed place in the politics and history of the region, they will not be part of the analytical framework of this article. Instead of that, he will talk about the oil embargo of 1973-1974 and determine what theory could provide an explanation for that move. This article will elaborate on previous embargoes used in the region's recent history, before examining the 1973 embargo in depth. Regional history (1956-1973) 1956: Suez crisis and nationalization of Iranian oil 1956 marked the first time that Arab oil-exporting countries of oil decided to use oil as a weapon to achieve their political goals. That year, Egypt's Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. For the Egyptian leader, the Canal symbolized foreign exploitation in Egypt. By making such a move, the leader thought of giving economic independence to his country. This move by the patriarch of Nasserism caused the retaliation of 3 military forces: British, French and Israeli. Across the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia saw everything that happened... middle of paper... and it ended with the Khartoum summit in August 1967. During the summit, it was stipulated that “oil will not be used as a direct weapon against Israel’s Western protectors.” This was seen as a setback for the Arab states. As a result of that decision, they had lost their lone negotiating tool, oil. Nonetheless, the anti-Israeli sentiment of the Arab states was still felt during the summit, as “the Arab states did not engage in any armistice or peace talks with Israel” (my translation). The 1967 war also brought about a change in Egypt's foreign policy, as the once positive neutralism now became a dependence on the Kremlin. In his book Le Proche-Orient éclaté, Georges Corm wrote that this war was not just an Arab loss against Israel, as “Nasserist, populist, socialist and Arab nationalist Egypt lost against the conservative, pro-Western and pan-nationalist Saudi monarchy Islamic”..”.