In chapters three and four of A Brief History of Ethics, Alastair MacIntyre makes a clear distinction between two philosophical doctrines at loggerheads: the Sophists and Socrates. The sophistic amalgam of personal success, lust and power is constantly interrogated by an interlocutor in an infinite situation to reveal sophistic ignorance, fruitless desires and the right to universal justice. MacIntyre identifies the codes of both parties and further supplements the debate with historical examples to conclude the social success (or lack thereof) and persuasion of both sides. MacIntyre begins by outlining the general amalgam of sophistic theory: success. The areté (virtue) of a sophist is to be a successful citizen through conformity to the social convention of justice (14). Using the dialogue Theatetus, he reveals Protagoras' doctrine as the link between relativism and knowledge: “As things appear to a perceiving individual, so they are” (15). The truth is discovered in a personal perspective, and therefore it was necessary to adhere to public conventions to achieve success. However, MacIntyre questions this interpretation of “personal realism” because, interestingly, it defeats the purpose of sophism; if all ideas are equal with respect to truth, then the superiority of truth is undefined. Unfortunately, social conventions vary from state to state. What a sophist needs to pay attention to in one state may be completely different in another. With this MacIntyre unmasks the first flaw of sophism: the individual has not been given a guide to the social conventions of a city-state, and therefore must adapt to the criteria of each state (16). Issues of social action and life must be defined as non-moral or pre-moral; an instrument branded as the natural man.......middle of paper......firmly believes that good and evil cannot be synonymous with pleasant and painful, but truly adjectives to evaluate the extent of pleasure and pain pain (30 ). This then reinforces the requirement of a limited desire since the desire itself can only be defined by assessing the extent to which that desire is desired. MacIntyre closes by evaluating the concept of good as desire and objective. Without a goal it is not possible to define a limit and therefore there will never be any satisfaction. And, when man does not know what a satisfying desire can be, then there is no guarantee of realizing this desire. If an object is to be good, Socrates justifies that it must be defined by its own rules of good desire. The sophistic intent to destabilize universal truth, make desire limitless, and persuade only for power promises a truly unintelligible and lost individual.