The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was a joint resolution passed by the United States Congress on August 10, 1964 after a military incident between the United States and North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin bordering the coast of Vietnam. The military incident was an attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American destroyer on August 2, 1964, and two days later there was an alleged second attack on the American destroyer. These two attacks by the North Vietnamese led to the settlement of the Gulf of Tonkin. The resolution authorized the President "to take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or state party to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom"[1] (HJ RES 1145)which led the United States to become more directly involved in the Vietnam War. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay President Lyndon B. Johnson used the ill-defined and vague grant of authority to significantly intensify the U.S. military presence in Vietnam with the introduction of combat troops. Many consider this a crucial event in the history of the United States Congress as it was the turning point that allowed Johnson to wage an undeclared war without direct congressional approval. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed following the second attack on 4 August 1964, which the attack was later proven to have not occurred. This research paper will analyze the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by examining its origins and explaining its implementation. The article will place particular emphasis on analyzing the argument that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was misused by the Johnson administrations and on the constitutional and ethical dimensions of false pretenses politics. Origin of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: The origin of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution can be traced back to a highly classified secret program called Operation 34A. This program was designed to allow the United States to clandestinely support South Vietnamese Special Forces operations. The primary objective of these operations was for South Vietnamese Special Forces units to sabotage South Vietnamese coastal transportation facilities North by raids. “The program required the intelligence community to provide detailed information on commando targets, the North's coastal defenses and related surveillance systems.”[2](Schuster) Operation 34 A was a major cause of the crisis occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 2, 1964, the United States Navy destroyer USS Maddox was patrolling the waters near the coast of North Vietnam to execute an intelligence-gathering operation under the authority of Operation 34A. USS Maddox was responsible for an intelligence-gathering operation called "Desoto Patrol" in which a "highly classified team aboard USS Maddox was relaying sensitive North Vietnamese communications to National Security Agency headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland."[3] (Pusey pg. 72) While executing the Desoto patrol, USS Maddox detected that it was being pursued by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. “As North Vietnamese patrol boats continued their pursuit of the American destroyer, USS Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they approached within ten thousand meters.” (Schuster page 30) North Vietnamese patrol boats ethe USS Maddox exchanged fire, but neither ship caused significant damage. When USS Maddox reported to Washington that the destroyer had been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats, President Johnson met with his senior advisors to consider a response. The president, along with his senior advisors, agreed that it was possible that a local North Vietnamese commander, rather than a senior official, had ordered the attack on the USS Maddox, so they decided not to engage in retaliation. Instead of retaliating, President Johnson ordered the continuation of the Desoto patrols and added another destroyer, the Turner Joy, to escort the USS Maddox. Two days later, USS Maddox was again patrolling the coast of North Vietnam for the "Desoto Patrols", but was accompanied by another destroyer, Turner Joy, due to the earlier attack on USS Maddox. While patrolling, USS Maddox received signals that the destroyer had again been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Due to signs of aggression, USS Maddox reported to Washington that she was once again under fire from the North Vietnamese. When the reports were received in Washington, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara urged the president to respond to the attack. And within hours, President Johnson launched airstrikes on North Vietnamese bases in retaliation for the attack. The first air strikes to hit North Vietnam were four North Vietnamese patrol boat bases, as well as an oil storage depot located in the city of Vinh. The Implementation of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: After President Johnson ordered the launch of air strikes on North Vietnamese military bases in retaliation for the alleged attack that occurred on August 4, 1964, President Johnson turned to Congress for the request to increase the US military presence in Vietnam. On August 6, 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified at a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees about the events of August 4 in the Gulf of Tonkin. McNamara emphasized that "the immediate occasion for this resolution is the trend of North Vietnamese attacks on our warships..."[4](McNamara p. 136) During McNamara's testimony, the committees did not they were aware of Operation 34A's covert operations so the joint The session turned into a discussion for a resolution to increase the US presence in Vietnam as they believed the USS Maddox had been attacked without provocation. After Robert McNamara's testimony, Congress held a floor debate on whether to pass the resolution. It was decided that the United States would increase its presence in Vietnam, so Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 10, 1964. The joint resolution authorized the president "to take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force , to assist any member or Protocol State of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom"[5]. Congress understood that the resolution would give broad authority to the President, yet the Senate and House of Representatives passed it by a vote of 88-2 in the Senate and unanimously in the House, 416-0. With the authority to express greater military might in Vietnam, the United States quickly launched Operation Rolling Thunder, a large-scale bombing campaign of North Vietnamese targets. Rolling Thunder's objective was to carry out bombing raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a network of trails through dense jungle that connected theNorth Vietnam and South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was used by the Viet Cong to smuggle supplies and secretly move troops. The President's goal for Operation Rolling Thunder was to disrupt the movement of manpower and supplies from North Vietnam, which would result in a boost in morale in the South Vietnamese government. Not only did the President authorize the increased air power, but President Johnson also increased “boots on the ground” in the region. Before the resolution was passed, there were approximately sixteen thousand American troops in South Vietnam. The role of American troops was to act as military combat advisors, to train the South Vietnamese to fight the North Vietnamese and guerrilla forces in the campaigns known as the Viet Cong. The purpose of the training was to strengthen the new South Vietnamese government. However, as the United States supported "nation-building" training programs for South Vietnamese troops, South Vietnam continued to suffer from a weak government and continued casualties at cargo of the North Vietnamese army. When the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed, the number of American troops in South Vietnam increased significantly. In 1965 there were more than one hundred and fifty thousand American soldiers in Vietnam. Many of those troops were wounded or killed and when Johnson left office in 1969; “over thirty thousand American soldiers and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese had died” (Pfiffner page 13). [6] The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution created a large-scale military conflict in Vietnam that became increasingly unpopular with Americans. The ethical dimensions of the resolution: Many ethical objections have been raised regarding the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. After the second attack on USS Maddox and the subsequent response to retaliatory airstrikes ordered by President Johnson, the crew of USS Maddox reported that they reviewed radar contacts and other information and determined that the second attack report by of the North Vietnamese may have been doubtful. . “Subsequent SIGINT reports and faulty analysis that day further reinforced previous false impressions. After-action reports from Gulf participants reached Washington several hours after news of the second incident broke.” (Schuster) Although information about the hoaxes was reported to Washington, the Johnson administration still turned to Congress to address the attacks. During McNamara's testimony, the committees were unaware of Operation 34A's covert operations and that the second attack most likely did not take place. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara were aware that the second attack on the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin was most likely a faulty analysis. However, when both men addressed Congress, they acted as if the second attack had undoubtedly occurred. It can be argued that the President and the Secretary of Defense lied to the American people and members of Congress about the events that occurred on August 4 to escalate the war in Vietnam. President Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam almost certainly had more to do with domestic U.S. politics than support of "any member state or protocol of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of one's freedom". HJ RES 1145) President Johnson had taken office following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, meaning that Johnson had been president for the remainder of what would have been Johnson's first termKennedy, just under a year before his re-election. To consolidate his entire presidential term, Johnson combined Kennedy's popularity and won the Democratic nomination. However, in the 1964 election, Johnson was then involved in a bitter presidential race with the Republican senator from Arizona, Barry Goldwater. One of Goldwater's major criticisms of Johnson was that he was soft on communism. “On several occasions, he criticized the Johnson administration for “being indecisive” and “not taking a stronger military position” on the Vietnam issue.” (Cherwitz pg.34)[7] The driving force behind the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was the attempt to demonstrate that President Johnson was not soft on communism. He used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to secure victory in the presidential race, knowing that Congress would not oppose military action against North Vietnam, especially during an election year. Johnson's political deception has brought the American people into an unwinnable war. Not only did the Johnson administration lie about the justification for escalating military action in Vietnam; the administration has exceeded the intended purpose of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The ethical issues of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution involve the deception of the American people, but also the abuse of power granted by the resolution. ASAs previously stated, Congress understood that the resolution would give broad authority to the President when Congress passed the resolution overwhelmingly. Congress was led to believe that the United States was under attack by North Vietnam and the powers given to the President were believed to be used for an emergency. There is no doubt that Congress did not intend to authorize the President to expand U.S. forces in Vietnam without full consultation. Initiating a large-scale military conflict that could easily have evolved into a conflict with China or the Soviet Union was an outrage to Congress and the majority of the American people. Although the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was dissolved in 1969, just before the end of Johnson's term, the resolution's legacy is still felt today. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution set the standard for the executive branch to overstep its borders by abusing the war power granted to it by Congress. A modern example of the legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AuMF) passed by Congress after the 2001 terrorist attack. Much like the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the AuMF against the Terrorism was supposed to be a temporary grant of authority that allowed the president to take military action against the perpetrators of the attack. “However, the executive branch has used its authority for a decade, indefinitely, to transfer war authority to be used against any group a president may deem dangerous. “[8] (Shoon page 195) The cause of this ethical dilemma stems from the ambiguous language of the Constitution. Although the United States Congress has the power to declare war, the president is the commander in chief, and presidents can go to war without the popular consent of Congress. Conclusion: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a joint resolution passed by the United States Congress after a military incident between the United States and North Vietnam. The purpose of the resolution was to take all necessary measures to assist South Vietnam in the war with North Vietnam and its Viet Cong allies. With the authority to express greater power. 195