In utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill advances the "greatest happiness principle," which "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness. . [and] for happiness is willed pleasure and the absence of pain.” [1] Mill supplements the “greatest happiness principle” with the argument in Chapter II that some types of higher pleasures are intrinsically of greater value than others, because the judges competent prefer them even if they are accompanied by a lesser degree of pleasure. However, it is difficult to defend the antihedonist principle of higher pleasures as the central doctrine of Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism Since hedonism considers one pleasure of finite amount to be equal to another pleasure of the same finite amount, it seems that qualitative distinctions between pleasures cannot be reconciled without importing value-based principles foreign to traditional hedonism. This conflict is further complicated by the implications of Mill's conclusions on virtue. Mill states in Chapter IV that virtue has no higher intrinsic value, despite its preferred status: it is simply instrumental to happiness. It quickly becomes apparent that the higher pleasures of Chapter II are different from the virtue of Chapter IV: the higher pleasures are intrinsically more valuable, while the value of virtue lies only in its preferability. In Chapter IV, Mill provides a new framework for his preference-based utilitarianism – based on a dichotomy between will and desire – which offers a means of attempting a reconciliation between the inconsistent implications of Mill's conclusions in Chapters II and IV. However, it becomes apparent that Mill's theory of utilitarianism cannot be supported, as the distinction between will and desire proves to be an insufficient antidote to the internal contradictions of his preference-based utilitarianism. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay In Chapter II, Mill lays out his view of preference-based utilitarianism. It is possible to distinguish between two interpretations of this form of utilitarianism: the first states that it is the satisfaction of our preferences that has value, and the second states that it is the objects of our preferences that have value. In Chapter II, Mill clearly aligns himself with the second form of hedonistic utilitarianism. Mill's argument in Chapter II seeks to answer an essential phenomenological question: does an object have value because we prefer it, or do we prefer an object because it has value? Mill argues the latter: the intrinsic value of the object precedes preference, and a competent judge's preference for one object of pleasure over another indicates a higher intrinsic value in that object. Note that this topic largely depends on the jurisdiction of the judge. Mill develops the following argument in Chapter II as a justification for his initial position on preference-based utilitarianism: Pleasure Preference ArgumentA) “Of two pleasures, if there be one which everyone, almost everyone who has experience of both, give a decided preference, independently of any moral obligation to prefer it, that is, the more desirable [and valuable] pleasure” (9).B) “Those who are equally informed and capable of appreciating and enjoying both give a marked preference to mode of existence that employs their higher faculties” (9).C) Therefore, pleasures that employ the higher faculties are more desirable and valuable. Assuming that those who are equally familiar with both kinds of pleasure in Premise B act independently of any moral obligation to prefer it (a requirement of Premise A), and judges arecompetent and know both pleasures well, the argument is deductively valid. Mill's argument can also be defended against the objection that a desired object is not desirable in itself – Mill uses "Desirable" means necessarily desired, but this conclusion may not follow from the fact that the object is desired. However, Mill would probably respond that “competent judges” will always be able to identify the highest-valued pleasure and therefore for these wise judges the highest-valued object will always be desired. Thus, Mill might argue that those pleasures of the higher faculties, always preferred by competent judges, are necessarily desired – or desirable – at least for competent judges. Since a thorough investigation of the conditions necessary to be a competent judge is well beyond the scope of this article, Mill's argument will be accepted. Furthermore, Mill argues that the higher value of preferred pleasure is clearer in cases where one prefers an object of pleasure “while knowing that it will be accompanied by a greater amount of discontent” (9), or less pleasure. If this is the case – and if judges are truly competent and not mistaken in their preference – then Mill's argument is valid. Mill then distinguishes between satisfaction and happiness, demonstrating that pleasure and happiness are not necessarily the same thing. Mill argues that “it is better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig; better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool." (10). It should be noted here that Mill does not say that it is better to be an unhappy Socrates than a happy fool: happiness and satisfaction are not synonymous. Mill is incredibly clear: “Whoever supposes that this preference [for the pleasure of the higher faculties] comes at the expense of happiness – that the superior, being in similar circumstances, is not happier than the inferior – confuses the two very different ideas. of happiness and contentment” (9). And again, Mill argues that the satisfaction of higher pleasures brings a greater quantity of happiness, even when accompanied by “a greater quantity of discontent” (9), or a lesser quantity of pleasure. Therefore, it becomes unmistakably clear that, while satisfaction/contentment is obviously not synonymous with happiness, pleasure is not the same thing as happiness either. However, this seems to conflict with Mill's earlier definition of the “greatest happiness principle,” in which he states that “by happiness is meant pleasure” (7). The only conceivable solution to this contradiction is the following: even if pleasure is the only constituent of happiness (according to Mill's previous statement), not all pleasures contribute equally to happiness: the pleasures of the higher faculties contribute to the most happiness than the lower faculties do. pleasures. Mill's hierarchy of pleasure evaluation becomes more difficult to defend, however, once he addresses the concept of virtue in Chapter IV. In this chapter Mill reaches conclusions regarding the relationships between pleasure, desire, and happiness that appear to directly contradict the implications of Chapter II. Mill's utilitarianism “holds not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for its own sake” (36). However, Mill explains that this is simply a psychological phenomenon: an individual may originally desire an object (virtue) as a means of experiencing pleasure, but as he becomes more and more accustomed to this mode of behavior, he may stop looking beyond this object . of his originally instrumental preference. This object then becomes an ultimate preference, pursued as an end in itself. Mill is clear that virtue does not acquire a higher degree of value through this normative phenomenon, but it doesstill wanted more. Mill even links the instrumental desire for virtue to a miser's desire for wealth, since both are simply means to happiness that are confused with ends in themselves. Ultimately, Mill concludes that virtue becomes a part of happiness, since it is pursued as an end and yet happiness arises from it. A person who desires virtue “is made, or thinks he is made, happy by the mere possession of virtue; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it” (38). And Mill argues that preferences make those “sources of pleasure more valuable” (38). Thus, while Mill argues in Chapter II that the pleasures of the higher faculties are intrinsically superior in value to the lower pleasures, Mill argues in Chapter IV that the value of virtue lies predominantly in the desire for and preference for it. After explaining the psychological phenomenon surrounding the status of virtue as part of happiness, it is evident that "thinking of an object as desirable (except for its consequences) and thinking of it as pleasant are the same thing" (39). However, in Chapter II, Mill demonstrated that competent judges desire those higher pleasures that will bring them the greatest happiness, even when they are accompanied by less pleasure or more pain. Mill's earlier argument in Chapter II was based on the claim that not all pleasures contribute equally to happiness, and therefore the “competent judge” will desire those objects of pleasure which contribute most to happiness. Based on Mill's previous argument, if an individual simply desires those objects that are the most pleasant (as Mill argues should be the case in Chapter IV), then he will only be able to obtain the inferior pleasures of sensual objects and will never achieve happiness . Mill would refer to this individual as a “satisfied fool” in Chapter II, as opposed to the dissatisfied Socrates who possesses even more happiness than the fool. It seems that Mill's position in Chapter II cannot be supported in light of Mill's later claim that the desirable is the same as the pleasant. At the end of Chapter IV, however, Mill provides an explanation for this apparent contradiction and provides a new frame of reference. to reevaluate superior pleasures in chapter II and virtue in chapter IV: "the will is something different from desire" (39). Mill continues to explain that will is an active phenomenon and is different from the passive sensibility of the desire to please. Mill explains that the will “may in time take root and break away from the parent stock” (40), and through simple habit, an individual can desire an object just because he wants it. This could explain how virtue can be desired for its own sake, even if accompanied by less pleasure, and could also explain the phenomenon whereby higher pleasures are preferred, and even desired, despite providing a lower degree of pleasure than that offered from lower pleasures. , Mill clarifies that “will, in principle, is entirely produced by desire” (40). Therefore the will of the competent judge towards the pleasures of the higher faculties of chapter II must be preceded by the desire of the same. Given Mill's statement in Chapter IV that we desire only that which is pleasant, it becomes necessary that at some point in the past the pleasures of the higher faculties were accompanied by a greater degree of pleasure than the lower sensual pleasures. This desire must have then transformed into will and even after the pleasure derived from the higher pleasures fell to less than that of the lower and sensual pleasures, the will remained and the desire for the will was formed out of habit. At first glance, this appears to be the case. 7